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From Just War to False Peace
Robert J. Delahunty* and John Yoot

Abstract
This Article addresses the reliance of both poligmakers and scholars onjust war theof
as a guide to twenty-first centuU war. More especialy, it evaluates the assumption that the
UN Charter system is a modernitedform of historicaljust war theory. The Article traces the
genesis of various just war theories from ancient Greece and Rome through medieval
Christianity, arguing that these theories were based on moral and religious obligation. In the
early modern era, as papal supremagy weakened,just war theorizing tended to wane. In its
place,four deferent approachesto limiting war began to emerge: public internationallaw, jus in
bello, reason of state, and balance ofpower.Although there are indications of a revival ofjust
war thinking in the twentieth centuU, the Article argues that it is a fundamental mistake to
understand and treat the UN Charter as an adaptation of traditionaljust war principles.
Instead, the UN Charterexpresses an overriding commitment, not to the aim of ensuring that
war is waged ef and only if it is just, but rather to preserving the existing internationalorder,
regardless of that order'sjustice or injustice. The UN Charterforbids both preventive war and
humanitarianintervention unless authorized by the Security Council. Internationaljusticeand
the promotion ofpeace would be far better served, however, by a more flexible approach than is
afforded either by historicaljustwar theog or by the Chartersystem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Those who seek to outlaw war sometimes claim an ancient lineage, like
English aristocrats tracing their origins to a warrior who crossed the channel
with William the Conqueror. Political philosophers today explicitly describe their
work to be in the field of just war theory, invoking the examples of Cicero
working out the grounds for attacking barbarians or medieval jurists struggling
with the grounds for the Crusades.' Contemporary regimes to prohibit armed
conflict, first introduced by the League of Nations and reinvigorated by the UN
Charter, have called upon this history to claim that international law bans war as
an unjustified interruption of peace. In this narrative, the great powers'
unrestrained pursuit of raison d'itat from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries
presents the sharp break from the history of international law. As Stephen Neff
writes, the League of Nations and the period after 1919 "sought to reinstate the
fundamental principle that underpins just-war strategies," that is, "the notion
that the normal state of international relations is one of peace, with war
permitted only as an exceptional act requiring affirmative justification." 2
As utopian visions often are, this account is attractive and oft-repeated. It
may even describe what the drafters of the League of Nations or the UN
Charter believed they were doing. But it is mistaken. The twentieth century's
leagues and charters-and not the era of great power politics-attempted a
radical change in the course of history. From ancient times on, international
rules on jus ad bellum-the law governing the start of war, in contrast to jus in
bello, rules on the conduct of war-remained fundamentally separate from
political philosophy or religion. Ancient thinkers and medieval scholastics may
have argued over just war, but their claims remained rooted in the abstract world

I
2

See, for example, Michael Walzer, ArguingAbout War 3-4 (Yale 2004).
Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations:A GeneralHistory 279 (Cambridge 2005).
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of philosophy and morality, not the real world of diplomacy and conflict. One,
of course, might influence the other, but a war that might violate Christian
morals did not automatically run counter to international law, and vice versa.
By confusing concepts of justice with the longstanding rules of
international politics, modern day political philosophers and legal scholars are
not just getting their history wrong. The error has also led to the dysfunctional
UN Charter system that formally governs war today. It prohibits military conflict
when everyone-the great powers, the states where civil war is occurring, and
innocent bystanders-would benefit. At the same time, it creates the illusion
that the current rules themselves promote justice, when instead they protect a
status quo that can do little to restrain the actions of the great powers while
discouraging interventions that would improve global welfare. Once we
understand that the current system marks a sharp departure from the traditional
rules of international politics, we can begin to rebuild a system that better
reflects the world as it is and gives nations the proper incentives to heal its worst
problems.
II. FROM ANCIENT TO EARLY MODERN TIMES
A. Customary Limitations on War in Ancient Greece
War, of course, did not emerge in the world along with the nation-state and
modern militaries. Armed conflict has beset humanity throughout its history,
and even before its history. From those earliest times, humanity has sought to
reach agreement on its limits. A number of examples can be seen in Ancient
Greek city-states that followed certain rules restraining the worst excesses of
war. Sophocles's Antigone centers on the general Greek practice of allowing
opponents time after a battle to bury the dead. In the play, Thebes has enacted
an exception to this rule for traitors, and Antigone is sentenced to death for
burying the body of her brother, Polynices. Similarly, in his Peloponnesian War,
Thucydides describes a number of customs that had prevailed among the citystates, such as giving immunity to emissaries, sparing women and children, and
protecting religious places.' As we will see, the laws of war bear these same
characteristics from the days of the city-states in Greece to the city-states of Italy
almost two millennia later. Nations do not express the rules of war in written
agreements; they arise instead from custom and tradition.4 Nations generally do
not restrictjusad bellum by law; they instead regulatejus in bello. To the extent that
nations limit the start of war, religious or moral considerations, rather than
notions of international law, drive the rules.

See generally Adriaan Lanni, The Laws of War in Anaent Greece, 26 L & Hist Rev 469, 476-82
(2008).
4

See, for example, id at 471-72.
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Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian War provides perhaps the
most famous example of these principles. The war pitted the two great
superpowers of the Greek world, Athens and Sparta, against each other in a
contest for supremacy. Athens remained dependent on control of the seas and
trade, while Sparta fielded the dominant land forces of the time. Both cities
sought to build alliances with dozens of other city-states to support a struggle
that spanned decades. The many interactions, whether peaceful or hostile,
between these states provide a great deal of information about the practices of
the ancient Greeks in what might be thought of as international affairs. And
because Thucydides is often considered the first modern historian and first
"realist" scholar-he discounts religious or supernatural explanations for events
and instead focuses on the intentions and incentives of different states, and sees
their struggle as one for power-his account is more reliable than other Greek
sources of the time.
In the Melian dialogue, as recounted by Thucydides, the Athenians present
the inhabitants of the island of Melos with the choice of either joining their
Delian League or being destroyed. The Athenians say that they will put aside
"specious pretense," such as claims that the Melians harmed them first or that
their leadership of Greece in the Persian Wars justifies their empire. The
Athenian envoys plainly declare: "[Y]ou know as well as we do that right, as the
world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do
what they can and the weak suffer what they must."' The Melians complain that
the Athenians only speak of "interest" and not of "right," and that this destroys
"our common protection, namely, the privilege of being allowed in danger to
invoke what is fair and right."' Pleading to remain neutral in Athens' struggle
with Sparta, the Melians appeal to "justice," while they accuse the Athenians of
speaking only of "expediency." The Athenians are unimpressed by appeals to
the gods: "Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law
of their nature they rule wherever they can."' When the Melians remain
unconvinced to join the empire, the Athenians lay siege to the city and
eventually conquer it. They put to death all the men of military age and send the
women and children into slavery.
In Thucydides's retelling, we see the main elements of the international
rules on war. Melos does not rely on any written treaty to claim that Athens
should refrain from an attack. Instead, its people appeal to a shared
5

See Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (Penguin 2003); Donald Kagan, Thugdides: The
Reinvention of Histog (Penguin 2009). See also Victor Davis Hanson, Introduction, in Robert B.

Strassler, ed, The Landmark Thugdides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War xiv-xxxiii
6

(Simon & Schuster 1996) (Landmark Thugdides).
Landmark Thugdides at 5.89 (cited in note 5).

7

Id at 5.90.

8

Id at 5.105.
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understanding of justice among the Greeks. The Melians' claim takes the form
of an appeal to the gods, rather than any notion of "law." To them, it is religion,
rather than the idea of positive law, that limits the freedom of states to go to
war. In the end, invocation of religious ideals fails Melos and the contest is
resolved in favor of "interest," as Thucydides puts it. The Athenians presented
the right of the strong to rule the weak as a principle of natural law, but not as a
standard of international law. Some scholars, such as Coleman Phillipson, have
asserted that the Greeks would always find some legal justification for armed
conflict, but the Peloponnesian War shows this to be untrue at least with regard
to any concept of secular law.' The Athenians, and the Spartans in turn, might
cite self-interest, religion, or undefined notions of justice as reasons for going to
war, but not international law as such. When the term "just war" appears in the
Greek sources, it is used first by Aristotle to describe wars by Greeks against
barbarians, where only moral principles and not law prevailed."o
Religion's importance becomes more prominent with regards to the rules
for the conduct of war once begun. Much of the Greek restraint in war-for
example, permitting religious ceremonies to continue-promoted respect for
sacred objects and places." Greeks generally gave religious sites and personnel,
such as temples and priests, immunity in combat. During the Peloponnesian
War, for example, Athens committed the rare act of fortifying a religious site
during the fighting in Boeotia. Athens did not argue that it had violated custom,
but instead claimed that military necessity had forced its troops to retreat to the
redoubt.12 Contending nations also paused the fighting to allow religious
ceremonies: the Olympic Games continued during the Peloponnesian War and
states would refrain from attacking on holy days. Even the principle of
respecting the dead stemmed from religion. Warring Greeks returned dead
bodies to the enemy and provided a time for their burial. This was not done for
humanitarian reasons, but to respect religious funeral rites.13 In Anltgone, the
tragic heroine does not invoke international law to support her violation of her
city's decree. Instead, she appeals to religion to justify her effort to bury the dead
body of her brother.
We can see the religious point in clearer relief against the contrast of the
conduct of war itself. Ancient Greeks did not understand humanitarian
considerations to limit the methods of warfare. No external norm restrained the

9

See Coleman Phillipson, 2 The Intemadonal Law and Custom of Andent Greece and Rome 179
(Macmillan 1911). For criticism of Phillipson on this point, see Arthur Nussbaum, just War-A
Lgal Concept?,42 Mich L Rev 453, 453 n 4 (1943).

10

Aristotle, Politics, Book I, viii (Dover 2000) (Benjamin Jowett, trans).

11
12

See Lanni, 26 L & Hist Rev at 476-82 (cited in note 3).
Landmark Thucydides at 4.98 (cited in note 5); Lanni, 26 L & Hist Rev at 477 (cited in note 3).

13

Lanni, 26 L & Hist Rev at 478-79 (cited in note 3).
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Greeks in their choice of weapons or tactics. No international law of war
prohibited, for example, killing prisoners in battle. Greek historians-including
Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Diodorus-tell of numerous
examples where Greek forces massacred enemy fighters or enslaved survivors,
even those who had surrendered. 4 As in the Melian dialogue, the lack of legal
rules applied even to civilians captured during a siege. After one siege,
Thucydides reports, the Athenians debated at length whether to massacre the
male population of Mytilene, but only on the grounds of policy. The debate did
not include a discussion of whether custom or law barred the choice." Earlier in
the war, Sparta decided to put the entire garrison at Plataea, an ally of Athens, to
death after it had surrendered." Religious observance did not protect
noncombatants from death in war.
Ancient Greek states also seemed to settle on a related point. War between
Greeks differed from war with foreigners. Conflict within a city-state was stasis,
while war between Greeks and foreigners was known as polemos." Although citystates divided the Greek world, they remained united in language, culture, and
heritage-even conflict between the Greeks became more a form of civil strife
than war." Greeks remained fiercely loyal to their city, but they also shared a
common ethnic and cultural identity that shaped their view of war." At the same
time, the city-states carefully guarded their sovereignty and independence, which
meant that conflict would often break out among them. Greek competitiveness
meant that they were in conflict all the time; as one of Plato's speakers observes
in The Las, "in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not
indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting." 20 In the Greek universe, there
was no permanent state of peace from which war erupted unnaturally.
We should not obscure the debate among classicists over whether any legal
rules restrained war among the Greeks. Military historian Victor Davis Hanson
argues that some rules did exist among the ancient Greeks, such as those
restricting hoplite warfare to certain seasons and limiting the pursuit and killing
of civilians and the defeated. 2' Hanson argues that these standards gave way

14

W. Kendrick Pritchett, 5 The Greek State at War 205-19 (California 1991).

15

See Landmark Thucydides at 3.36-49 (cited in note 5).

16

See id at 3.52-68.

'7

Victor Davis Hanson, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian
War 10 (Random House 2005).

18

Neff, War and the Law of Nations at 19 (cited in note 2).

19

Coleman Phillipson, 1 The InternationalLaw and Custom ofAnient Greece and Rome 32-33 (Macmillan
1911); David J. Bederman, The InternationalLawin Antiquity 33-34 (Cambridge 2001).
Plato, 4 DialoguesofPlato 156 (Houghton 1897) (Benjamin Jowett, trans).

20
21

See Hanson, A War like No Other at 299 (cited in note 17); Victor Davis Hanson, The Western
Way of War Infantry Battle in ClassicalGreece 14-18 (Knopf 1989).
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before the higher stakes of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars in the fifth
century BC. Others, such as Adriaan Lanni, argue that the earliest signs of
restraint grew out of the limits of hoplite warfare, which depended on slow,
heavily armed farmers, rather than out of any norms-once the technology of
22
Greek warfare changed, war could and did become more destructive.
Regardless of the outcome of this debate, it should remain clear that the
Greeks did not believe that any limits applied to the choice of when to go to
war, only how to wage it. Self-restraint may have arisen from religious
obligation, self-interest, or concern over reciprocal treatment, but the Greeks did
not understand any legal rules to bind their decisions on whether to go to war.
B. The Roman Understanding of Just War
Roman understandings of war more closely resembled our own. Scholars
conventionally point to the writings of Marcus Tullius Cicero as the starting
point of a just war tradition that has come down to us through the ages.
Though Roman practice and thought was changing and diverse over a thousandyear history, Cicero is a central figure. He first introduced the idea that war
should advance some good beyond merely a national self-interest in expansion.
For Cicero, the natural state of mankind was of peace-war, therefore, was an
unnatural interruption that required declaration and justification. 24 "Wars, then,
are to be waged in order to render it possible to live in peace without denial of
rights," writes Cicero in De Offciis." A Roman leader should have a just cause, a
iusta causa, to go to war. "No war can be undertaken by a just and wise state,
unless for faith or self-defense," Cicero wrote.26 If not for self-defense, war
should come only in response to an earlier wrong, such as an attack on allies or
ambassadors, a breach of treaties, or support for an enemy. Cicero
acknowledged that just causes might also include punishment of the enemy, but
the unifying idea remained that Roman war occurred in response to an earlier
wrong.
Rome observed its just war tradition with religious ceremony. A just war
could not begin without the approval of a special college of priests, the fetiales.
The fetiales existed to "take care that the Romans do not enter upon an unjust
war against any city in alliance with them," and to perform the ceremony of

22

Lanni, 26 L & Hist Rev at 484-85 (cited in note 3).

23

24

See, for example, Henry Wheaton, HistoU of the Law of Nations in Europe and America 21 (Gould,
Banks 1845).
See Neff, War and the Law ofNations at 34 (cited in note 2).

25

Cicero, De Offidis, Book I,

26

Cicero, On the Commonwealth, in Marcus Tullius Cicero, Tuscalan Disputaionsat T 37 (Harper 1899)

11 (Little, Brown 1887) (Andrew P. Peabody, trans).

(C.D. Yonge, trans).
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demanding justice of the enemy before hostilities could begin.2 7 Ceremonies
included dispatching a priest to the enemy territory to demand satisfaction
(repetitio rerum), declaring war if no response was forthcoming after thirty-three
days, and throwing a spear into enemy territory to symbolize the beginning of
hostilities.2 8 While there is some argument over the precise nature and order of
the procedure, the central point remains that, in Cicero's words, "in the public
administration, also, the rights of war are to be held sacred."29 War was not just a
tool of state policy; it was governed by religious principles translated through
human interpretation. According to Alan Watson, the Roman gods served as
more than mere witnesses to the observance of religious forms. They were the
arbiters in contests between peoples, much in the way judges resolved private
disputes between individuals.30
Cicero, however, discusses just war theory at length without reference to
religious sanction. For him, just war was an element of natural law. "In a
republic the laws of war are to be maintained to the highest degree. For there are
two ways of deciding an issue, one through discussion, the other through force,"
Cicero writes in a well-known passage. "The former [is] appropriate for human
beings, the latter for beasts."31 Peace was the normal state of human relations in
nature, and war therefore was an unnatural interruption. It follows for Cicero
that Rome must fight a just war honorably and must show mercy to the
conquered, though Roman war permitted the seizure of property and the
enslavement of the population. For Rome, a war must be iustumpiumque: just and
pious.
In practice, however, just war thinking did not impose any meaningful
restrictions on the reasons for war. Instead, Romans seemed to focus more on
following the forms of legal observance than the substance of the justification
for hostilities. We can see the just war doctrine's weakness-in contrast to the
restraints imposed by religious consequences-on display during the expansion
of the Roman Republic. While there are instances where Rome obeyed just war
principles, there are many, if not more, examples where Roman leaders
manufactured events to satisfy the form and rules of just war. Rome would use
hostilities involving an ally as an excuse for war, violations of neutrality,
mistreatment of ambassadors, and breaches of treaties. It sometimes made the
demands for a peace treaty so onerous that war would inevitably break out. It

27
28

Alan Watson, InternationalLaw in Archaic Rome 2-3 (Johns Hopkins 1993) (quoting Dionysus of
Halicarnassus).
See Phillipson, 2 The InternationalLawand Custom ofAndent Greece and Rome at 339 n 4 (cited in note

29

9).
Cicero, De Ofiis at

3o

Watson, InternationalLaw in Archaic Rome at xi-xii (cited in note 27).

31

Cicero, De Offidis at

11 (cited in note 25).
11 (cited in note 25).
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would deliberately enter into an alliance with an ally that was threatened or
already engaged in hostilities with another city, to produce the grounds for war.
While the Senate honored the forms required by legal and religious ceremony, it
32
clearly pursued territorial expansion and plunder rather than self-defense. As
Polybius observed, Rome always sought a pretext for war so as not to be the
public aggressor. But Rome's steady expansion across Italy and the entire
Mediterranean world obviously was not in self-defense.
And then we find situations where no just war restraints seem to be
present. The First and Third Punic Wars provide obvious examples. At the time
of the First Punic war in 264 BC, Carthage rivaled Rome in the Mediterranean,
but she carefully avoided giving any cause for hostilities-it was Roman
intervention in a war between Syracuse and Messina in Sicily that sparked
conflict.33 While the Second Punic War might have been inevitable, by the time
of the Third Punic War Carthage no longer posed a threat to Rome. Yet, Rome
destroyed her old enemy anyway.3 4 Another well-known example, even in
ancient times, of Roman war without attention to ideals of justice was Julius
Caesar's conquest of the Gauls. In his Gallic Wars, Caesar did not produce an
arguable case of harm done to Rome by Gaul-the war was clearly motivated by
conquest, a fact that did not go unnoticed among Caesar's critics. Cicero even
claimed that the lack of just causus belli in the many conflicts in the first and
second centuries BC led to the fall of the Republic. "So long as the sway of the
Roman people was maintained by the bestowal of benefits, not by injustice,"
Cicero wrote, "our sovereignty might then have been termed the patronage,
rather than the government, of the world."" But once this policy of just war was
"abandoned" in the years after Sulla's dictatorship, "we are being justly
36
punished" with civil wars and "the republic we have completely lost."
Cicero's vision of just war was an ideal, one which Rome rarely, if ever,
followed in its long conquest of the Mediterranean world. Roman religion was
essentially understood from a juristic perspective, as a matter of public law and
public order. Other scholars, such as Phillipson and David Bederman, accept
Cicero's view and suggest that the Roman law of war had become secular. "It is
hard to discern a legal institution from these aspects of Roman religion and
(almost) magical belief," Bederman writes of the fetiales ceremony, "[b]ut there
was one."" These principles of just war, however, were not part of the jus
gentium, the law that applied to all people. The Romans, for example, could not
32

See William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B.C 163-75 (Oxford 1979).

3

See id at 182-90.

34

See id at 234-40.

3s

Cicero, De Off dis, Book II,

36

Id.

37

Bederman, The InternationalLaw in Andquity at 234 (cited in note 19).
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expect a foreign nation to follow the procedures of the ius fetiale, though they
might wish an enemy to declare war only for certain circumscribed reasons.3
Rather, as Cicero writes, the fetiales were part of the "human laws," but "under all
guarantees of religion." 39 It was the particular genius of the Romans to
transform a religious practice into a legal concept. A just war would have secular
reasons, but still needed to meet with the approval of a college of priests. A
bellum justum must still be a bellum pium. But whether the Romans followed the
ceremonies or not, they did not allow justice to stand in the way of conquest.
C. Development of Just War Theory in Medieval Christianity
The end of the Republic eliminated any distinction between the concepts
of just war and religious oversight. The emperor was both a divine figure and the
princeps: his decisions on war represented the judgment of the highest religious
and civilian authority. Wars that sought to unify the Empire or defend it from
external enemies no longer needed any separate justification from a college of
fetiales. Christianity, however, penetrated the Empire, culminating in
Constantine's conversion and the establishment of Christianity as Rome's state
religion. Christianity's injunction to "love thy neighbor" created deep tensions
with the secular demands to defend the Empire from barbarian invasions.40
Christian thinkers began their long struggle over the question of whether military
service and killing in war were sins. After Constantine's conversion, theologians
such as St. Ambrose began to view the Empire as the protector of Christianity,
and military service and war as the necessary shield for civilization and peace.41 A
Christian could fight to keep the barbarians at bay to protect the state and
church, but the reasons why remained less than clear.
St. Augustine began the intellectual work of resolving the conflict between
Christianity and war by resurrecting just war theory. It is important to
understand that the work of the late Roman and early medieval thinkers did not
train their sights primarily on state policy and notions of international law.
Rather, the question remained whether individuals could serve in the military
and kill in combat without violating their Christian ideals-early Christian

38

On this point, Henry Maine is mistaken in arguing that the ius gentium was a subset of the iusfetiale.
See id at 236.

3

Cicero, De Officiis, Book I,

40

See, for example, Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, JusticeAmong Nations: On the Moral
Basis of Power and Peace 73 (Kansas 1999). See also G.I.A.D. Draper, Book Review, The just War
Doctrine, 86 Yale L J 370 (1976); James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War:
Rekgious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740 (Princeton 1975); Nussbaum, 42 Mich L Rev 453 (cited in
note 9).

41

See Frederick H. Russell, The just War in the Middle Ages 12-15 (Cambridge 1975). See also M. H.
Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages 8 (Routledge 1965).

111

(Harvard 1913) (Walter Miller, trans).
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thought had urged against serving in the imperial armies. 4 2 As with Roman and
Greek understandings, the Christian approach turned on the religious duty owed
by the individual, not the secular law that governed between states. In his Contra
Faustum, for example, St. Augustine described the dilemma thus: "[IMs it
necessarily sinful for a Christian to wage war?" 43 The Christian theologian
answered "no." A Christian could wage war when he did so not out of malice or
hatred, but out of love of his enemy." War punished the wrong and prevented
45
them from sinning again, rather than serving any desire for glory or revenge.
St. Augustine's understanding of individual religious duty led him to a
similar view of just war. War served the purpose of recovering lost rights, either
those inflicted by another state or by its citizens.46 In City of God, he compared
both capital punishment and war to advance divine instructions as examples of
killing that did not violate the Ten Commandments." In its goal, however, St.
Augustine's approach justified a broader scope to war than existed for Cicero.
Cicero's just war was either defensive or sought compensation for a past injury.
The Christian just war had a broader, punitive dimension that sought not only to
make the state whole, but also to punish the wrongdoer for violating moral
principle. 48 Because it is punitive in nature, war relied on more than just a simple
plea for compensation, instead demanding reference to a broader set of rules.
For St. Augustine, war arose to enforce the iur, not, however, a ins limited to
commonly accepted legal rules, but a ius that included righteousness and
iustilia-justice. St. Augustine's innovation linked earlier Roman legal and
religious notions of a just war to Christian principles. While he clearly borrowed
from Ciceronian concepts, St. Augustine expanded war and infused it with the
divine purpose of waging war to advance the will of God and biblical
principles. 4 9 As Nussbaum observed, Augustine's rules on just war were "religiophilosophical.... In no way did they lay down legal rules."50 War was a
transgression of the divine order and was more of a sin than a crime.

42

Nussbaum, 42 Mich L Rev at 455 (cited in note 9).

43

As quoted in Draper, 86 Yale LJ at 372 (cited in note 40).

4

See St. Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, in 4 A Select Libray of the Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers of the Chistian Church, Book XXII, 75 (Christian Literature 1887) (Philip Schaff, ed).

45

See, for example, Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages at 17-18 (cited in note 41); Keen, The
Laws of Warin the Late Middle Ages at 66 (cited in note 45).
See Russell, The just War in the Middle Ages at 18 (cited in note 41); Paul Ramsey, The just War

46

According to St. Augustine, in Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed, Just War Theoy 8, 13 (NYU 1992); Herbert
A. Deane, The Politicaland Social Ideas ofSt. Augustine 154-71 (Columbia 1963).
47

Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages at 22-23 (cited in note 41).

48

Id at 19.

49

See id at 23.

so

Nussbaum, 42 Mich L Rev at 455 (cited in note 9).
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In the disorder that followed the collapse of the Empire, early medieval
thinking revolved around the use of just war for the pursuit of religious ends.
Popes and clerics sought to encourage European kings and nobles to defend
Western Christendom from external competitors and violent internal disorder.
Popes, for example, approved war to convert barbarians, heretics, and nonbelievers, and to defend the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire from
Muslim incursions." At the same time, they tried to suppress war for secular
purposes among the European nobility. The Crusades became the highest
expression of war used for papal purposes-in this case, the liberation of the
Holy Land. Just war changed from secular conflicts of compensation or
punishment for past wrongs to missions to defend and spread the faith. Sanction
for unjust wars came not from the law, but from the religious threat of eternal
damnation.
Some Roman lawyers in this period continued the linkage of the individual
right to resort to violence with the greater right of a state to go to war. Some
commentators on Justinian's Corpus luris Civilis, known as the Glossators and
post-Glossators, developed their views on just war from the individual's right of
self-defense from attack, though there was disagreement over whether the right
of self-defense derived from private law or the ius gentium. Private individuals
could attack and kill to forestall their own murder or robbery, but not to seek
gain or vengeance. Similarly, a public war would become a bellum lidtum-a
"permissible" war-under the ius gentium and natural law if it prevented injury to
the self or another, in other words if it was in self-defense or preserved the
peace.52 Gratian's great compilation of canon law in 1140, the Decretum, declared
a war against heretics to be just because it punished sinners and prevented them
from sinning again. Gratian stated that a war was just then if a state seeks
compensation for stolen property, responds to an enemy attack, or punishes past
injuries. 3 It is important to see the difference between a bellum lidtum and a
bellum justum. Descending from the thought of Cicero and St. Augustine, the
latter occupied the universe of religion and morality. The former, however, arose
from the ius gentium and therefore conceptualized the rights of nations in a way
similar to the rights of individuals. Law and justice were separate and distinct,
with the doctrine of just war acquiring its force from religion and philosophy.54
An important, perhaps overriding, issue for scholars of this time, known as
"Decretists," who commented on Gratian, was the source of authority for
51
52
53
54

See RusseU, The Just War in the Middle Ages at 27-39 (cited in note 41).
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Medieval Lawyers, in Thomas P. Murphy, ed, The Holy War 99, 106-09 (Ohio 1976).
Laurent Mayali, Droit, Raison et Nicessiti Dans la Thdorie de la Guerre an Mqyen Age in Corinne
Leveleux-Teixeira et al, eds, L. gouvernement des communautis poliiques a la fin du Mqyen Age : Entre
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declaring war. They continued to see the notion of just war as more religious
than legal, and more an issue of sin than a violation of Roman (in contrast to
canon) law. In the disorder after the fall of the Empire, these thinkers prohibited
war by private individuals. War had to be declared by some public authority, but
with no single Roman emperor, the right devolved to kings and princes. This
diverted attention from analysis of the just causes that could support war and
instead focused on the political or-in the case of the Crusades-religious
authorities who could declare the opening of hostilities. By the end of the
twelfth century, in other words, lawyers and philosophers had done little to
advance just war theory beyond the frameworks of Cicero and St. Augustine,
and instead used law to regulate the process of declaring war. "The just war was
the province of princes, popes and prelates," scholar of medieval history
Frederick H. Russell summarizes. "Mts use was justified when it was necessary
to defend the patria against hostile force and to protect the Church from its
many enemies."ss Russell mistakenly assumes that just war is a legal as well as
religious concept, but he correctly describes the commentators' struggle over
authority as central.
In the following century, canon lawyers known as the "Decretalists" sought
to give more precise legal form to these ideas. They developed a number of
criteria for a just war: persona, res, causa, animus, and auctoritas.First, war had to be
fought by laymen, not members of the priesthood. Second, the war must be to
recover stolen property or to defend the country or the Church. Third, a just
cause required that war be necessary. Fourth, Christians could not go to war to
punish, but to make whole. Fifth, a prince, king, or emperor of proper authority
had to declare the war. Rather than focus on the substantive causes for war, just
war theology concentrated on jurisdiction-which princes, kings, popes, or
emperors could legally start war. A war's justice became the proper
consideration of soldiers and vassals, who could suffer spiritually for following a
superior's orders in an unjust conflict." Due to the personal spiritual
responsibility of the individual, war became an aggregation of many conflicts
between soldiers as well as states. For them, a legal war narrowed down to an
analysis of the legitimate political authority to declare public hostilities, rather
than whether the causes of war were just.
But even as these writers narrowed the scope of a legal war, they conceived
of self-defense as sharply different. Repelling attack became understood as part
of the natural law that did not need to meet any of the five requirements for just
war." John of Legnano, a fourteenth-century professor of civil law at the
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University of Bologna, viewed self-defense as a "particular war" waged by a
single individual, as opposed to a "universal war" by a whole community, which
derived from the right of anyone to self-preservation." Without self-defense as a
possible causa, just war became more akin to dispute resolution or law
enforcement. A just cause for war was to seek compensation for a previous
harm or to recover lost rights. The Crusades, however, assumed the status of a
war to recover lost ri hts because popes considered the Holy Lands to belong
only to Christendom.6
It was the task of St. Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologiae of the latter
half of the thirteenth century, to codify these different strands in Christian
approaches to war. As others have observed, Aquinas sought to harmonize
canonical teachings with the views of Aristotle and natural law.6 ' He accepted St.
Augustine's view that war is not a sin when it is: (a) waged by a public authority;
(b) for the purpose of punishing wrongdoers; and (c) with the intent of securing
peace and helping the good or avoiding evil.62 Aquinas referred to the second
factor as just cause: "those against whom war is to be waged must deserve to
have war waged against them because of some wrongdoing." 63 Quoting St.
Augustine, he continued: "A just war is customarily defined as one which
avenges injuries, as when a nation or state deserves to be punished because it has
neglected either to put right the wrongs done by its people or to restore what it
has unjustly seized."64 Aquinas accepted the punitive character of war, but he
also expanded upon the duty of kings and princes to maintain the public good
by killing malefactors (just as a doctor could amputate a diseased limb),
maintaining order and peace, and preserving the Christian faith."
Others have observed that the Thomistic approach to war only restated the
conventional Christian understanding of war. It is also important to understand
that Aquinas did not address himself to temporal law, but to religious and moral
obligation. Indeed, the issue that drew the most attention from medieval
lawyers-the auctoritas princijpis of those who declare war-merited little
discussion. Instead, Aquinas remains significant because his work provided a
comprehensive moral restatement of the Christian approach to war that
provided the jumping off point for later scholars. That thinking culminated in
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the work of two Spanish monks, Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, as
the West left the medieval world and emerged into the modern world.
Spain's conquest of the New World moved Vitoria to address just war. In
two works, On the Indians Latey Discovered and On the War Made by the Spaniards on
the Barbarians,Vitoria outlined the ways that the Spanish empire in the Americas
could become just, but had yet to do so. He rejected the claims that the Holy
Roman Emperor or the Pope possessed the whole world and could grant the
Americas to Spain, that a right of discovery applied to lands already peopled by
the Indians, that the Spanish had a right to conquer non-Christians and stop
their violations of natural law, or that the Indians were already Spanish
subjects. 66 Although Vitoria accepted the punitive purposes of just war
developed by Augustine and Aquinas, the Indians had not committed any harm
to Spain. Instead, Vitoria argued, Spain could resort to armed force because the
Indians sought to exclude her citizens from travel, trade, settlement, and
propagation of the faith in the Americas. Vitoria, however, recognized that the
Indians might reasonably use force to defend themselves from the Spanish, who
must have appeared strange and threatening. In a departure from the law
enforcement model of earlier medieval thinkers, Vitoria raised the possibility
that both sides of a conflict might have a just cause.6
Suarez notably rejected Vitoria's notion that a war could be just on both
sides. Writing only a few years before the publication of Grotius's De jure Belli ac
Pads, Suarez pursued the theme that war was the outcome of a judicial process
between contending nations." War amounts to a judgment against a wrongdoing
nation, and therefore a just cause could only benefit the nation that had suffered
harm. Although they disagreed on this point, Vitoria and Suarez still shared an
important overall assumption. For Vitoria, a just war did not seek vindication
through the law of nations. Instead, whether war was just was a matter for the
forum conscientiae, the forum of conscience, and not for jurists. Similarly, for
Suarez, the rules of just war did not rely on a legal system for existence. They
remained the domain of popes and priests, who enforced the rules through
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excommunication, the threat of eternal damnation, or the release of subjects
from their duty of loyalty."
This Section has traced the development of just war theory from its ancient
origins through the medieval period. Its differences from the just war thinking
of today are striking. Just war emerged from the obligations of individual
morality or religion; it had little purchase as a legal rule that governed relations
between states. Indeed, the idea that war must have a just cause demanded little
attention in legal and political practice. Greeks held no concept that a legal war
must have a just cause, and the Romans seemed to view the idea as a matter for
religious ceremony that could be easily manipulated. While medieval thinkers
developed a more refined and extensive theory of just war, it still remained
primarily a matter for the individual conscience. Thus, the causes for legal war
went largely unexplored, in contrast to the great debate over the process or
forms of war-whether the proper public authorities had declared the start of
hostilities. This suggests that contemporary appeals to just war restraints, as
embodied in public international law or the UN Charter, make little sense,
because they seek a doctrine ripped out of its intellectual and historical
moorings.
III. FROM THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD TO THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
The Protestant Reformation and the related rise of the modern state led to
fundamental changes in the ways in which European statesmen and thinkers
viewed the relationship between justice and war.7 2 As claims of papal supremacy
in theological and political matters weakened their hold, and as control over the
instruments of violence were increasingly concentrated in the hands of national
sovereigns, the question of the "justice" of initiating war came to have less
importance in the conduct of international relations. Indeed, by the end of this
development in the early twentieth century, international law had come to teach
that the decision of whether to wage war was a prerogative whose exercise lay
within the discretion of every sovereign state.73 This prerogative was considered
71
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to be an essential element of sovereignty,74 if not indeed sovereignty's "ultimate
expression and prerogative."7 5 Although statesmen continued to justify their
decisions to wage war in moral terms, no "cause" was considered necessary for
war to be lawful. Thus, for English publicist John Westlake, attempts "to
determine in the name of international law the conditions on which a recourse
may be had to arms, as that an offer of arbitration shall have been made," merely
represented "the counsel of morality," not "rules of law.""
At least four major, interacting trends in thinking about international
relations worked to bring about this transformation. First, the rise of modern
public international law, especially in the form it took in the work of Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645), rejected just war theory. Second, a decided shift in
emphasis away from the jus ad bellum, which can also be credited largely to
Grotius, led to a growing preoccupation with jus in bello. Third and fourth, two
doctrines of international relations, or two ways of thinking about that subject,
emerged: raison d'itat or reason of state, and balance of power theory. Both of
these doctrines served, as just war theory had aimed to do, to limit the occasions
of war. We shall briefly examine each of these four developments in turn.
A. Public International Law
Hugo Grotius was, and remains, a vastly influential presence in
international law and political theory.7 Yet he is difficult to interpret. Michael
Walzer and others claim that Grotius "incorporated just war theory into
See also C. A. Pompe, Aggressive War: An InternationalCrime 301-02 (Nijhoff 1953) ("War was a
fact, an international phenomenon, and classic [nineteenth century] international law was
indifferent towards it.... A 'legality' of war supposed distinction between just and unjust wars,
which may have lingered on in public opinion and may have been defended by some authors, but
was not, according to the majority of them, part of international positive law.").
7
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international law."'7 That, we think, is a mistake. On what we consider the better
reading of Grotius, his doctrine of the law of nations effectively overturned
traditional just war theory.79 But even on a plausible alternative reading, Grotius
did not so much codify just war theory as eviscerate it.
In his great work The Rzghts of War and Peace, Grotius at first appears to
follow the tradition in saying that "[wlar cannot be just on both sides." 0 That
assumption is crucial to any genuine theory of just war, because the very point of
the theory is to identify which of two belligerents is acting rightly in deciding to
wage war, and which has the obligation to surrender."' But for Grotius, the
question of which belligerent can properly claim to have justice on its side does
not generally admit of an answer. Typically, all belligerents will claim to be in the
right, and neutral third parties will be reluctant to decide between those claims.82
In the absence of any higher sovereign who has the power to evaluate the claims
and control the actions of sovereign nation-states, it will be lawful for the latter
to do as they please: like kings, they are answerable to no one else." Wars begin
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"where the Methods of Justice cease."84 Consequently, just war theory cannot be
invoked to decide which belligerent may lawfully wage war and which must
concede.
On this interpretation, just war theory is, for Grotius, like pacifism. It is a
doctrine that, whatever its attractions might be, is simply impracticable in
conducting relations between sovereign states.8' Furthermore, Grotius maintains
that just war theory itself contributes to the likelihood and ferocity of war, since
men are more apt to wage war, and to fight with greater violence and tenacity, if
they think that their cause is just." The bitter religious and ideological struggles
of the Thirty Years War,. which Grotius himself witnessed, may have
underscored that view.87
For Grotius, the "justice" of war reduced in the end to a question of
formalities." Although he fully recognized that war could in fact be waged
without formalities (just as slaves could cohabit without formalizing a marriage),
he believed that certain formalities were required to give war a just or, better, a
public character. In particular, the main formal conditions he identified as
necessary to accomplish this were that the war be made on both sides by
sovereign states and that it be duly declared. The existence of declarations by
proper public authorities effectively sufficed, for Grotius, to license warring
states in harming each other; no reference to substantive "justice" on either side
was needed.
An alternative reading of Grotius also commands some scholarly support.
On this approach,"Grotius held that war is justifiable when, and only when, it
serves right. Since the conditions for service to right are numerous and
nonobvious, he must expend considerable effort identifying and explicating
them."" Thus, on this alternative interpretation, Grotius's theory of just war is
an extremely thin one. This putative form of just war doctrine would forbid a
state to defend itself if it were attacked by an aggressor who was "serviceable to
many."" And contrary to traditional just war doctrine, it would permit (some)
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preventive wars," Colonel Draper, one of the scholars who believes that Grotius
had a form of just war doctrine, concedes that its impact on state practice was

"nimal." 92
B. Jus in Bello
What now constitutes the corpus of international jus in bello began to take
shape in early modern Europe between, roughly, 1550 and 1700. A new
normative framework for the emerging European states system was necessary,
not only to "fill[] the void created by the collapse of the unity and authority
provided by the Church of Rome," but also to accommodate the growing
centralization of military power and domestic legitimacy in territorially based
states." The search for new rules to govern the conduct of hostilities, abundantly
evident in Grotius's work, reflects the interests of such states both in limiting the
pervasiveness of "private" violence, and in applying standards of instrumental
rationality to their violence against each other.94
To be sure, the emerging European tradition of jus in bello was firmly
rooted in the past: the military historian Geoffrey Parker argues that "the laws of
war in Europe have rested since the Middle Ages upon the same five
foundations,"" which he identifies as: (1) prescriptive texts, including the Bible,
Roman law, canon law, and the writings of figures such as St. Augustine and St.
Thomas Aquinas; (2) the teachings promulgated from the eleventh century
onwards by the Peace of God and the Truce of God; (3) various military
manuals and articles of war that were issued by national armed forces;" (4)
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customs arising from the practice of war; and (5) combatants' growing
appreciation of the advantages of restraint in warfare, including honoring truces
and surrenders, and sparing captives and the wounded. Nonetheless, the period
of the Reformation and afterward saw a decided turn away from jus ad bellum and
towards the development, and eventually the codification, ofjus in bello.
Several reasons lay behind this turn. First, as we have just seen, there was a
growing skepticism about the feasibility or even desirability of trying to frame
standards or rules of substantive justice to govern the power-political relations
between sovereign states. Second, the very prevalence of jus ad bellum theory in
Europe before the seventeenth century had inhibited the growth ofjus in bello."
There is indeed a conceptual, not merely a historical, connection between the
rise of one and the waning of the other: war is more likely to be regulated when
it is not forbidden." Just war theory tends to weaken a belligerent's inhibitions
because it appears to require or permit war, using the most dreadful measures
available.On the other hand, if an unjust war is categorically forbidden, there is
no possibility of regulating its violence. Finally, instrumental rationality
combined with religious and humanitarian feelings in calling for wars to be
fought with a minimum of suffering and loss of life. Why go to unnecessary
extremes of atrocity and destructiveness when military victory could be obtained
without such harm; when a more lenient policy could forestall retaliation if the
enemy invaded one's own territory; when peace would be more durable if the
defeated side had fewer memories of the victor's harshness; and when the evil
reputation that a belligerent would earn for exceptional cruelty in warfare could
be avoided?" Economy in the use of force seemed to dictate essentially the same
methods as moral restraint.
This new spirit of moderation in warfare infused even Spain, which by the
seventeenth century labored under the odium of being particularly cruel and
ferocious in its manner of war.'00 Painfully aware of this reputation, Spanish
rulers and generals consciously sought to overcome it. Thus, the historian John
Nef pointed to "the presence of a new chivalry-adjusted to novel and horrible
English Civil War, 118 Past & Present Socy 65, 83-87 (1988). See also Barbara Donagan, Atroeity,
War Crime, and Treason in the English Civil War, 99 Am Hist Rev 1137, 1142 (1994).
9

98

See Lynn H. Miller, The Contemporary Signgicance of the Doctrine of Just War, 16 World Pol 254, 258
(1964).
See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions,95 Pol Sci Q 83, 90-91 (1980).

99

On the incentives in international affairs to avoid reputational harms, see Andrew T. Guzman,
How IntemationalLaw Works: A RationalChoice Theory (Oxford 2008).

100

For an account of the origins of Spain's sinister reputation, see Benjamin Keen, The Black Legend
Revisited: Assumptions and Realities, 49 Hispanic Am Hist Rev 703 (1969). See also notes 101 and
102 and accompanying text. Interestingly, just as Spain's humanitarianism in war was dramatized
in the Spanish artist Velazquez's painting, so the "Spanish fury" in war was depicted by the
Flemish artist Peter Bruegel. See Stanley Ferber, PeterBruegel and the Duke ofAlba, 19 Renaissance
News 205 (Autumn 1966).
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weapons, hitherto unused," in Diego Velisquez's great painting from (perhaps)
1634-35, The Surrender at Breda (Las Lancas). Las Lancas portrayed the surrender
in 1625 of the defeated Dutch forces under Justin of Nassau to the Italian
aristocrat and Spanish commander, the Marquis of Spinola."0 ' Spinola's siege of
Breda had been a spectacular display of engineering and skill that had attracted
distinguished visitors from all over Europe, and although the Spaniards
prevailed in the end, the siege had been an exhausting one for both sides.
Nonetheless, General Spinola's terms for the garrison's surrender were
magnanimous-reflecting, perhaps, seventeenth century Spanish ideals for the
treatment of defeated enemies.102 "In spite of the religious wars [of the
seventeenth century]," Nef writes, "Europeans had at their disposal remnants of
the medieval conception of universal Christian community. They also had
remnants of the old chivalry and the pageantry that accompanied it."1 03
Others, while recognizing that a new humanitarian spirit was at work in
Europe by the seventeenth century, attributed its origin, not to the persisting
effect of Christianity, but to more secular causes. Notable among these was the
great nineteenth century Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz.
Clausewitz recognized that the seventeenth century had seen the beginning of a
new rationality and humaneness in warfare. But he ascribed this less to a
lingering tradition of Christian chivalry than to what he called "intelligence":1 0 4

101 John U. Nef, War and Human Progress:An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civil.ation 139 (Harvard
1950). Likewise, Theodore Rabb saw the painting of early seventeenth century Europe-including
that of Rubens as well as of Velazquez-as signifying a change in values. Of The Surrenderat Breda,
Rabb wrote that it
refused to proclaim unabashedly the majesty of war, but instead emphasized
quite different virtues even as [it] commemorated Habsburg victories. . . . [An]

emphasis on compassion . . . animates Velazquez's 'Breda,' and especially its
central figure, Spinola, the great general who was known to have urged an end
to Spain's debilitating wars.... [Tjhe 'Breda' gives little sign of the exultation
of victory. Instead of delight at the successes of Habsburg arms, it shows us
figures who are as pensive ... on the Spanish as on the Dutch side. And the
central gesture is an act of comforting magnanimity, not triumph, by Spinola.

102

103

104

Theodore K. Rahh, Artists and Warfare: A Study of Changing Values in Seventeenth-Centug Europe, 75
Transactions Am Phil Soc 79, 86 (1985). On the laws and customs of war regarding the surrender
after a siege, see John W. Wright, Sieges and Customs of War at the Opening of the Eighteenth Centu, 39
Am Hist Rev 629, 638-44 (1934).
For accounts of the cultural background and significance of Velazquez's painting, see Robin
Wagner-Pacifici, The Art of SurrenderDecomposing Sovenzgnty at Conflict's End 29-36 (Chicago 2005);
Jonathan Brown and J.H. Elliott, A PalaceforA King: The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip IV 17884 (Yale 1980).
Nef, War and Human Progressat 139 (cited in note 101).
Carl von Clausewitz, On War 15 (Oxford 1976) (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans) ("If,
then, civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and countries, it is
because intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare and has taught them more
effective ways of using force than te [sic] crude expression of instinct.").
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It had ceased to be in harmony with the spirit of the times to plunder and
lay waste the enemy's land, which had played such an important role in
antiquity, in Tartar days and indeed in medieval times. It was rightly held to
be unnecessarily barbarous, an invitation to reprisals, and a practice that

hurt the enemy's subjects rather than their government-one therefore that
was ineffective and only served permanently to impede the advance of
general civilization. Not only in its means, therefore, but also in its aims, war
increasingly became limited to the fighting force itself. Armies, with their

fortresses and prepared positions, came to form a state within a state, in
which violence gradually faded away.10
To be sure, Clausewitz was very well aware that, even if eighteenth century
intra-European war was "limited" in the ways he described,' the advent of the
wars of the French Revolution and of Napol6on had changed all that: for the
first time in centuries (or perhaps ever), European war had become "total," in
0
that one state pitted the entirety of its people and its resources against another.' o
Indeed, the very scale and intensity with which the French nation and people

fought those wars may be due, in part, to their perception that they were
engaging in a new species of "just war."' Yet even the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic wars did not permanently arrest the trend towards a more developed
105

106

107

10

Id at 236. Clausewitz is of course referring here only to wars within Europe, not to wars by
Europeans against non-European states and peoples, or against the natives of remote parts of
Europe such as the highland Scots and the Irish. On the former, see Jeremy Black, Culloden and the
'45 187-88 (St. Martin's 1990); on the latter, see Donagan, 118 Past & Present Socy at 70-71, 9395 (cited in note 96); Donagan, 99 Am Hist Rev at 1148 (cited in note 96). Wars waged by
"Western" European powers such as Sweden against "Eastern" European powers such as Russia
also displayed a savagery not found elsewhere, which included the use of bayonets, a weapon not
often employed elsewhere. Such practices have been explained in part by "the traditional
European's view of the Slav as less entitled than his own people to civilized treatment." Nef, War
and Human Progressat 253 (cited in note 101).
For criticism of Clausewitz on this point, see Gunther Rothenberg, The Age ofNapoleon, in Michael
Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds, The Laws of War 86, 86-87 (cited in
note 95).
See David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare As We Know It 8
(Houghton Mifflin 2007); J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 26-58 (Eyre &
Spottiswoode 1961); Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the
French Revolution and Napoleon, 18 J Interdiscipl Hist 771, 773-76 (1988).
Historians disagree over the nature and causes of the French Revolutionary Wars. Some see them
as primarily ideological wars; others contend that they were merely a continuation of the powerpolitical wars of the eighteenth century; and still others consider them to have stemmed from the
vicissitudes of domestic politics. What can safely be said is that the wars presented a direct
challenge to the bases on which the international society of states then rested, in particular to the
dynastic principle of legitimacy. The French revolutionaries argued that it was essential to draw a
distinction between a people or nation and its state or rulers, and that legitimacy fundamentally
depended on the popular will. This new principle was invoked to justify French foreign policy of
the period, including its refusal to recognize established international boundaries. See David
Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in InternationalSociety 84-91, 204-19
(Oxford 1993).
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humanitarian legal regime for war. Gradually but insistently, throughout the
latter half of the nineteenth century military manuals and, thereafter, multilateral
treaties began to codify jus in bello.'0o Thus appeared such landmark instruments
as the 1863 Lieber Code-used by the Union Army in the American Civil
War,o which is regarded as the origin of "Hague Law"; the 1864 Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in
the Field,' from which later "Geneva Law" derives; and the 1868 Declaration
of St. Petersburg,1 12 which introduced restrictions on the use of certain types of
weaponry in war. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 issued important
conventions that regulate the conduct of warfare and the use of weaponry,
including the 1907 Convention (IV) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land." 3 The codification of thejus in bello thus attained new heights even
as the doctrine of just war theory approached its nadir.
C. Reason of State
Reason of state can be described as the doctrine of the primacy of the state
over all competing interests or considerations-the teaching that "no value,
whether moral or secular, should stand above the security of the state" and that
"the moral rules applicable to the individual were not transferable to the state in
its behavior towards citizens or towards other states."" 4 Or, in Kenneth Waltz's

109

Adam Roberts, land Warfare: From Hague to Nuremberg, in Michael Howard, George J.
Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds, The Laws of War 116, 119 (cited in note 95) ("Up to the
mid-nineteenth century the laws of war did exist, but in a form very different from today: in
custom, in broad principles, in national laws and military manuals, and in religious teaching. The
second half of the nineteenth century was ... an era of belief in progress in controlling war.
Indeed, that characteristic modern encapsulation of the laws of war-the multilateral treaty
setting out principles in this field for states to follow-was only invented in the second half of the
nineteenth century.").
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See US War Dept, Instructionsfor the Government ofArmies ofthe United States in the Field(1863), online
at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument (visited March 30, 2012). For
discussion of the origins and application of the Lieber Code, see generally Burrus M. Carnahan,
Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Originsand Limits of the Principle of Miktary Necessity, 92 Am J
Ind L 213 (1998).

111

The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded of
Armies in the Field (1864) 22 Stat 940 (1865). This convention marks the point at which the rules
of jus in bello began to become multilateral.
See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
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Grammes Weight (1868), 138 Consol TS 297 (1868).
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and in Its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), 36 Stat 2277 (1907).
Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in InternationalRelations since Machiavelli 15
(Yale 2002). Important studies of the concept include Sir Herbert Butterfield, Raison D'Etat: The
Relations Between Moralty and Government: The First Martin Wight Memorial Lecture (Apr 23, 1975);
Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D tat and Its Place in Modern History (Yale
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formulation, "the conditions of international politics [do not] permit statesmen
to think and act in terms of the moral and legal principles that may be both
serviceable and acceptable in domestic politics."" Like medieval just war theory,
the doctrine was addressed to rulers and those charged with advising or assisting
them in administering a state's affairs. The doctrine instructed them to pursue
the interests of the state above the interests of other claimants to their support
and loyalty, such as the Papacy, as well as over purely dynastic or personal
interests.' 16 Moreover, it dictated a policy driven by rationality, rather than by
passion or whim. Although sometimes understood as a description of how states
do or even must behave, it is better seen, and in its origins it was seen, as
normative guidance for how states should behave."' One normative justification
offered for the reason of state doctrine was, therefore, that the rational pursuit
of a state's goals in international relations tends towards the limitation of war
and the mitigation of its horrors."' Another justification was that the doctrine
admonished statesmen "to carry out a foreign policy in the interest of the whole
nation and not just in the selfish interests of the ruling elite."" 9
In order to understand the doctrine properly, it is essential to bear in mind
that it originated in the post-Reformation period, as the modern European state
was still being formed. Other powerful (and, as we would say today,
transnational) actors in European affairs, including the Papacy and the Holy
Roman Empire, were pressing competing claims to universal loyalty and
obedience over the heads of local rulers, including kings. Likewise, political
actors at the sub-state level, such as local lords and magnates, sought to
command the population's allegiance and to extract its resources. The reason of
state doctrine served to legitimize the priority of the king's claims over the
competing claims of the Church, the Empire and the aristocracy. A king's

1957) (Douglas Scott, trans). A briefer treatment is found in Daniel Philpott, The Religious Roots of
Modern InternationalRelations, 52 World Pol 206, 234-37 (2000).
"s
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117

Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War:A TheoreticalAnaysis 38 (Columbia 1954).
Thus, under the leadership of the seventeenth century figure Cardinal Richelieu, a high-ranking
Catholic prelate and the chief minister of a Catholic state, France intervened decisively against the
Imperial-Catholic Habsburg powers in their contest with the Protestant forces. Richelieu, an
adept practitioner of "reason of state," sought to maintain Europe's balance of power and thus
prevent the Habsburgs from achieving universal dominion. For studies of Richelieu's reason of
state policy, see William F. Church, Richelieu and Reason of State (Princeton 1973); R. Harrison
Wagner, War and the State: The Theory of International Politics 73-76 (Michigan 2007); Donald M.
Mackinnon, Power Politics and Religious Faith: The Fifth Martin Wight Memorial Lecture, 6 Brit J Intl
Studies 1 (1980).
This point is rightly emphasized in Wagner, War and the State at 63-65 (cited in note 116).
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See Reinhart Kosellek, Critique and Crisis: Enlghtenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society 46-48
(MIT 1988) ("[I]t was the very primacy of politics that offered an opportunity to meet moral
demands as well-bv a detour, so to speak, by way of rationalising both war and the State.").

119

Robert G. Gilpin, The Richness of the Tradition of PoliticalRealism, 38 Intl Org 287, 303 (1984).
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demand for the subject's undivided loyalty was based on the promise that he and
his forces would provide the population in return with security within the
borders of his realm. The doctrine and practice of reason of state enabled the
ruler to make good on that promise.
It is also important to see that the doctrine, like just war theory,
"represented an attempt to order policy to cope with a universal predisposition
to conflict."' 20 Conflict was understood to arise from "passion," which could
most effectively be checked by the sober, far-sighted and "interest"-based
calculations of "reason."'21 For example, reason of state counseled kings to
observe the treaties that they had made: the long-term reputational advantages
that a policy of treaty-compliance brought were seen generally to outweigh the
benefits of breaking a treaty in order to exploit another state's momentary
weakness, despite the opportunity for making conquests that such vulnerability

might seem to afford.122
Finally, reason of state represented an attempt to solve, or at least to
mitigate, a problem inherent in the theory and practice of an emerging royal
absolutism. If the Church, feudal custom, and the law could no longer check the
power of the monarch (as in the premodern period), how could monarchy be

120
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Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity at 17 (cited in note 114).
See Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: PoliticalArguments for Capitalism before Its
Triumph 43-44 (Princeton 1977).
Again, we may cite the example of Cardinal Richelieu. Richelieu's conception of statecraft laid
considerable emphasis both on what he called "continuous negotiations" and on the sanctity of
treaties. See Sir Herbert Butterfield, Dplomag, in Ragnhild Hatton and M.S. Anderson, eds, Studies
in Diplomatic History: Essays in Memory of David Bayne Horn 357, 365 (Longman 1970); Butterfield,
Raison DEtat at 16 (cited in note 114) (stating that "one of the most valuable parts" of Richelieu's
writing is the emphasis on continuous negotiations). Richelieu's emphasis on continuous
negotiations stemmed from:
his profound belief in the general power of reason and language. 'Authority
constrains obedience,' he writes in [his] Testament Poitique, 'but reason
captivates it. It is much more expedient to lead men by means which
imperceptibly win their wills than, as is more the practice, by those which
coerce them.'
G.R. Berridge, Richelieu, in G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte, Dialomaic Theory
Kissinger 71, 75 (Palgrave 2001). Richelieu also thought that an enlightened selfsnterest in maintaining "reputation"-which he saw as a key ingredient of a monarch's powercounseled the strict observance of treaties.
'Kings,' he writes, 'should be very careful with regard to the treaties they
conclude, but having concluded them they should observe them
religiously.... A great prince should sooner put in jeopardy both his own
interests and even those of the state than break his word, which he can never
violate without losing his reputation and by consequence the greatest
instrument of sovereigns.'

from Machiavelli to

Id at 78.
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distinguished from tyranny? 12 3 Reason of state doctrine, which purported to
identify an objective and rational standard that the monarch could grasp and
follow, was one of three overlapping solutions: the other two were "princely
virtue," which attempted to instill the habits of self-restraint in the monarch, and
"enlightened despotism," which sought to direct absolute power to the pursuit
of the common good.124
Although reason of state doctrine has long been condemned as immoral, 125
its most thoughtful defenders have seen it as a necessary, indeed virtuous,
response to a tragic situation. Discussing Machiavelli, Kenneth Waltz posed the
question:
[W]hy should the success of the prince in establishing internal order and
contriving a defense against external enemies be taken as the criterion by
which any act [of statecraft] can be justified? Why define success in terms of
princely or state interest instead of, say, in terms of living a moral life?126
Machiavelli's answer, said Waltz, appealed to the desperate straits to which
Italy had been reduced by her rulers' inability to defend her against foreign
invaders. Italy was, according to Machiavelli, "a country without dykes or banks
of any kind" to be used against foreign foes; had she been "protected by proper
measures, like Germany, Spain, and France, this inundation . .. would not have
happened at all."1 27 In conditions in which a state is unable to defend itself and
its people from devastating and repeated foreign invasion, there is no possibility
for those within that state of living lives with a measure of independence,
decency, and virtue. To secure the state against ruthless foreign enemies of the
kind that had made Italy wretched, Machiavelli argued, its rulers must prove to
be no less unscrupulous than their opponents. As Waltz put it, "[i]f by cruelty
the dykes and banks are built and kept in good repair, then cruelty is the greatest
mercy. If by practicing virtue they are torn down again, then virtue is the greatest
* n128
vice.
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On early formulations of the doctrine of royal absolutism in the works of Jean Bodin and his
adherent, King James I of England, see Harold J. Berman, 2 Law and Revolution: The Impact of the
Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition 234-38 (Belknap 2003). On the weakening of
medieval legal and customary restraints on royal power, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovemgnty: God,
State, and Self 58-64 (Basic Books 2008).
See Daniel H. Deudney,.Bounding Power: Republican Security Theoryfrom the Polis to the Global Village 69
(Princeton 2007).
Alternatively, reason of state doctrine is criticized for giving no, or only a weak, defense of the
values of the societies that it is invoked to defend. See Jack Donnelly, The Ethics of Realism, in
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations 150,
154-55 (Oxford 2008).
Waltz, Man, the State and War at 215 (cited in note 115).
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Id at 215-16.
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Id at 216.
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Paradoxically, then, the "immoral" reason of state doctrine offered a
plausible and attractive alternative to just war theory in guiding the practice of
statecraft. Its exponents could argue that it was at least as well suited as the more
traditional doctrine to limit war and preserve peace. By forcing rulers to meet the
exacting standards of rationality, it discouraged dynastic wars and forced them to
consider the best interests of their peoples. Its regular practice instilled virtues
that tended to promote peaceable habits, including fidelity to treaties and a
willingness to negotiate. It served to protect the state and its people from foreign
aggression. And it enabled kings engaging in state-formation to justify their
claims to rule as against the competing claims of the Pope, the Emperor, or the
aristocracy.
D. Balance of Power
Like the reason of state doctrine to which it was both historically and
conceptually linked, balance of power theory emphasized the security of
individual states against the encroachments of other states or empires seeking to
aggrandize themselves. And like reason of state doctrine, it counseled rationality
and long-term calculation in the pursuit of self-interest: the survival of an
individual state was seen to be contingent on maintaining the existence of the
system in its entirety against the domination of any single member. Although
balance of power thinking accepted the inevitability and, in some circumstances,
the desirability of war (including preventive war),'29 it was thought to help
maintain peace, in that it offered a permanent check on individual states' drive to
self-aggrandizement. 3 0
Balance of power doctrine has been in the making for centuries: Waltz
finds the doctrine expounded on by Thucydides in the fifth century BC and by
Polybius in the second century BC.'31 European statesmen and diplomats began
as early as the fifteenth century to think of international relations in terms of a
"balance of power" by means of which peace was to be maintained and one
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See Friedrich von Gentz, Fragments on the Balance of Power in Europe 64 (M. Peltier 1806); Sir Francis
Bacon, Of a War with Spain, in 2 Works of FrancisBacon, Lord Chancellorof England 204 (Carey 1841)
(Basil Montagu, ed).
Thus, in the 1833 account by the eminent nineteenth-century German historian Leopold von
Ranke, the ascendancy of seventeenth-century France under King Louis XIV had imperiled the
independent development of other European states and cultures. "This arrogated supremacy,
which was constantly disturbing the peace, threatened to destroy the foundations of European
order and development." Leopold von Ranke, The Great Powers, in Georg G. Iggers and Konrad
von Moltke, eds, The Theory and Practice of History: Leopold von Ranke 65, 71 (Bobbs-Merrill 1973)
(Wilma A. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke, trans). The solution was found in the balance of
power: "The concept of the European balance of power was developed in order that the union of
many other states might resist the pretensions of the 'exorbitant' court, as it was called." Id at 73.
See Waltz, Man, the State and War at 198-99 (cited in note 113). See also Arthur M. Eckstein,
MediterraneanAnarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome 2 n 2, 48 n 55 (California 2006).
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state was to be prevented from dominating others. In 1612, the renowned
international lawyer Alberto Gentili, an Italian Protestant, argued in his De Jure
Belli Lbri Tres that the European states were justified in resisting the claims to
universal domination by Spain on the one side and the Ottoman Empire on the
other. Reflection on and theorization of the balance of power were brought to
new heights in the eighteenth century, and the policy of maintaining the balance
"appeared to many observers as something with moral justification of its own,
almost independent of any practical value it might have."' 32 In other eighteenth
century formulations, however, the balance of power was taken to be more
mechanical than moral and voluntary; it was compared to gravitational forces in
the planetary system or to the "invisible hand" that guided the selfish market
choices of individuals into socially beneficent outcomes.' 33 As Jean-Jacques
Rousseau put it, "[t]he balance existing between the power of these diverse
members of the European society is more the work of nature than of art. It
maintains itself without effort, in such a manner that if it sinks on one side, it
reestablishes itself very soon on the other."1 3 4 In such formulations, the doctrine
posited a natural or mechanical process of alliance diplomacy that would ensure
that no single power was able to remain unchecked if it sought to take excessive
advantage of its superior position and capabilities."'
Even in its eighteenth century heyday, however, the balance of power had
severe critics. 1 6 The philosopher Immanuel Kant rejected the idea that "a socalled European balance of power" could bring permanent, universal peace.
That notion, he said, was "a pure illusion."' 7 Kant himself was appalled by the
several partitions of Poland by its great power neighbors (Prussia, Russia, and
132

M. S. Anderson, The Rise ofModern D/plomay 1450-1919 165, 150-166 (Longman 1993) (tracing
evolution of the doctrine).

13
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See id at 165-68.
Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theof of Underbalancing, 29 Intl
Security 159, 162 (Autumn 2004). For an analysis of Rousseau's defense of the balance of power
and specifically of his claim that "peace ought to come of itself," see Marc Trachtenberg, The
Question ofRealism: A Historian's View, 13 Sec Studies 156, 174-76 (2003).
An alternative, and sounder, understanding of the doctrine would recognize that the efforts to
achieve and maintain a balance of power generally encounter considerable friction. The American
political theorist Nicolas John Spykman affirmed this when he wrote:

1s

Political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherently stable
condition. It results from the active intervention of man, from the operation
of political forces. States cannot afford to wait passively for the happy time
when a miraculously achieved balance of power will bring peace and security.
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America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power 25 (Harcourt, Brace
1942).
See Michael Sheehan, Balance of Power 103 (Routledge 1996) (quoting views of British
parliamentarian William Wyndham).
Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theof, but It Does not Apply in Practice,'
in H.S. Reiss, ed, Kant: Political Writings 61, 92 (Cambridge 1970) (H.B. Nisbet, trans).
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Austria),' which led to the utter annihilation of Poland as a state-the very sort
of outcome that the balance of power was supposed to prevent. Some studies
also suggest that the balance of power system that prevailed in Europe for most
of the eighteenth century was in fact far more violent and war-prone than the
"Concert of Europe" system that superseded it after the defeat of Napoleon and
the great peace settlement at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.1'3 As one scholar
of the eighteenth century has written, "[b]alance-of-power politics-the politics
of confrontation-generated intolerable international tensions, produced
increasingly serious armed conflicts, and inspired progressively extravagant plans
of aggression. It neither maintained peace nor preserved the independence of
sovereign states; by the time of the French Revolution, the international system
had broken down altogether." 4 1
Scholars disagree over whether, how, and why the nineteenth century
Concert of Europe system differed from the eighteenth century balance of
power.141 One possible understanding is that the Congress of Vienna consciously
sought to create a rough equality of power among the leading states, thus
institutionalizing a mechanism that made it easier for blocking coalitions to be
formed. 142 This view runs up against the problem, however, that the settlement
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See W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewit, Marx, Engels, Tolstoy 8 (Cambridge
1978).
See Paul W. Schroeder, The 19th-Century InternationalSystem: Changes in the Structure, 39 World Pol 1,
2, 10-11 (1986) (arguing that nineteenth century international peace derived mainly from systemic
change, reflected in institutional arrangements that differed from the eighteenth century norm);
Paul W. Schroeder, The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or PoliticalEquilibrium?,15 Rev Intl
Studies 135, 141-42 (1989) (discussing the significance of the balance of power idea in European
political and social life); Paul W. Schroeder, Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?, 97
Am Hist Rev 683, 684--90, 694, 696, 701-02 (1992) (discussing how the balance of power
influenced the Vienna Settlement); Robert Jervis, From Balance to Concert: A Study of International
Security Cooperation, 38 World Pol 58 (1985) (discussing the concert system in place from 1815 to
1854); Robert Jervis, A PoliticalScience Perspective on the Balance of Power and Concert, 97 Am Hist Rev
716, 718-23 (1992) (analyzing the balance of power idea and its impact on the frequency of war).
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Richard B. Elrod, The Concert of Eumpe: A Fresh Look at an InternationalSystem, 28 World Pol 159,
161-62 (1976); see also Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order, andJustice 102-04
(Johns Hopkins 1967).
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For the argument that the master concept of the Congress system was the "Great Power
principle," see Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the
Conditions of International Stability 232-47 (Oxford 1994). The Concert's mechanisms were
operating, albeit feebly, as late as 1912-13. See Richard Langhorne, The Collapse of the Concert of
Europe: InternationalPolitics 1890-1914 4 (St Martin's 1981).
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at Vienna left two of the great powers-Britain and Russia-stronger than any
of the others. 4 3 In any event, whether conceived of as a balance of power
system or as a distinctive kind of international order, the Concert system
brought Europe a "long peace"-almost a century (1815-1914) without a major
war involving all the great European powers.
Like just war theory, balance of power doctrine offered a compelling
normative goal: the maintenance of European-wide peace, together with the
preservation of the liberty and independence of European states great and small.
Yet it could well seem more practicable than just war theory, because it
prescribed state conduct, not on the basis of disputable moral judgments, but by
reference to the measurable phenomena of relative state power. Finally, although
balance of power doctrine, unlike traditional just war theory, permitted
preventive wars to maintain or restore balance, it also operated to limit such
wars because they ought to stop when the balance was reestablished, rather than
putting the enemy state's existence at risk. Together, Grotian international law,
the rise of jus in bello, the doctrine of reason of state, and balance of power
thinking overshadowed traditional just war doctrine from the early modern
period onwards.
In the period from the Protestant Reformation to the early twentieth
century, like the period from antiquity to the late Middle Ages, the moral and
religious doctrine of just war had little discernible influence on the actual
conduct of states. Indeed, if anything, the rise of the modern state and the
declining importance of the Catholic Church as an arbiter of international affairs
meant that just war doctrine had even less practical import than before.
European states went to war against each other regularly from the sixteenth
century to the twentieth with little to no heed to the requirements of just war
teaching. Eighteenth century wars in Europe, like those of Louis XIV of France,
were fought for the purposes of dynastic glory, the acquisition of territory and
populations, or the maintenance or restoration of the balance of power.
Nineteenth century wars in Europe, like the Napoleonic wars, were fought to
prevent one power from achieving unquestioned mastery over the continent or,
like the mid-century wars in Germany and Italy, to forge modern nation-states
out of still semi-feudal remnants of the dynastic era. Preventive wars that would
surely have been condemned by classical just war theorists were, not merely
common, but an accepted and legitimate method of statecraft: when asked for
his views on Polish nationalism, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck
replied that while he had no particular hostility towards it, if the state of Poland

other two; but arguing also that that reasoning depends on assumptions about the third state's
view of the preferences of the potential aggressor state's victim state).
143
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2009).

Summer 2012

31

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

were reconstituted, he would strangle it in its cradle.'" Furthermore, European
states in this period waged almost incessant wars of conquest and annexation
outside Europe (or on its fringes) with little to no consideration to the demands
of elementary humanity. They or the post-colonial states that succeeded them
overran the Americas, conquered the Indian subcontinent, partitioned Africa,
and divided much of China and the Ottoman Empire into "spheres of
influence." Although, as we have argued, the doctrines of jus in bello, reason of
state, and balance of power probably exerted some restraining effects on these
actions (particularly within Europe itself), the impact of just war doctrine on
them seems to have been negligible.
Change began with the First World War. The final collapse of the Concert
system in that war discredited the idea of maintaining peace through a balance of
power. Certainly the US President, Woodrow Wilson, took the view that the war
was largely due to the inherent instabilities of an international order based on
shifting alliances and efforts to balance power.145 Nor was Wilson alone in
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In his celebrated "Peace Without Victory" speech ofJanuary 22, 1917, Woodrow Wilson had said:
The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world
depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or
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Address by the President of the United States, 54 Cong Rec S 1741, 1742 (Jan 22, 1917). Likewise,
in his speech presenting the Versailles Treaty to the Senate on July 10, 1919, Wilson identified the
balance of power as the cause of the War:
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dominion and other nations had known no means of defence except
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Europe,-of every arrangement of the world,-that preceded the war. Restive
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They knew that no old policy meant anything else but force, force,-always
force. . . . A war in which they had been bled white to beat the terror that lay
concealed in every Balance of Power must not end in mere victory of arms
and a new Balance.
Address by the President of the United States, 58 Cong Rec S 2336, 2338 (July 10, 1919). For the
Wilsonian vision and its aversion to the use of a "balance of power," see Philip Bobbitt, The Shield
ofAchiles: War, Peace, and the Course ofHistoU 359-60 (Knopf 2002). See also Thomas J. Knock, To
EndAll Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Questfor a New World Order 112-15, 195-96 (Princeton 1992).
For anticipations of Wilson's condemnation of the balance of power and alliance diplomacy in the
thought of eighteenth century philosophers and the influence of their ideas on early American
(and ultimately Wilson's) thought, see Felix Gilbert, The 'New Diplomagy" of the Eighteenth Centuy, 4
World Pol 1, 8-9, 13-14, 28, 31-32, 37-38 (1951).

32

TI/ol 13 No. 1

Delabunty and Yoo

FromJust War to False Peace

reaching that conclusion.'46 And there are indeed reasons to think that a
multipolar balance of power, such as existed before the First World War, is likely
to be less stable than a bipolar one, like that of the Cold War.'4 7
But Wilson's objections to the pre-war international system ran even
deeper. His conception of the post-war settlement called, not merely for an end
to balance of power politics, "cabinet" diplomacy, and the pursuit of national
interest, but for at least a partial revival of just war theory. In the manner
reminiscent of traditional just war theorists, Wilson viewed aggressive war as a
criminal activity, and a counter-war against aggression as akin to the prosecution
and punishment of that crime.'48 Thus, he stated at the end of the peace
conference that the terms of the Versailles Treaty were:
very hard, it is true, but at the same time every one must realize that the
Germans themselves had brought on this horrible war, and that they had
violated all ethics of international law and international procedure, and had

created a series of crimes that had amazed and shocked beyond belief all the
people of the world.149
Wilsonianism inspired later twentieth century attempts to create new forms
of international security and to frame new doctrines of international law,
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The war was widely perceived as "a conclusive demonstration that the balance of power system
could not provide security for either the powerful or the small nations of the world." Alfred Vagts
and Dedev F. Vagts, The Balance of Power in InternationalLaw: A HistoU of an Idea, 73 Am J Intl L
555 , 576 (1979). Many jurists-Americans prominently among them-condemned the balance of
power in favor of what they saw as a more moral system. Id at 576-77. See also Christian Lange,
Histoire de la Doctrine Pacifique, 3 Receuil des Cours 175, 222 (Librairie Hachette 1927) ("Le
cataclysme mondial de 1914 ne fut au fond que le resultat logique de la politique d'equilibre." As
translated by Authors to: "The global cataclysm of 1914 was fundamentally nothing other than
the logical outcome of the policy of balancing.").
See Michael W. Doyle and Geoffrey S. Carlson, Silence of the Laws? Conceptions of International
Relations and International Law in Hobbes, Kant and Locke, 46 Colum J Transnatl L 648, 653-54
(2008).
At the time of America's entry into the war, Wilson had held the view that the "military masters"
of Germany were responsible for the conflict, but that the German people, as their mere "pawns
and tools," could not be held to blame. As the War progressed, however, he concluded that the
German people were behind their rulers' militarism. See Manfred F. Boemke, Woodrow Wilson's
Image of Germany, the War-Guilt Question, and the Treaty of Versailles, in Manfred F. Boemke, Gerald
D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser, eds, The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years 603,
610-12 (Cambridge 1998). Consistent with his view of Germany as a criminal nation, Wilson
considered himself and his Allied colleagues to be "sitting as judges" at the Versailles Conference.
Id at 613. He was therefore immovable "precisely on those questions that the Germans objected
to most vigorously--questions that had a punitive character and involved national honor and
prestige, such as exclusion from the League of Nations, the trial of the emperor, the delivery of
war criminals, and of course the war-guilt clause of Article 231." Id. Wilson failed to grasp that
"one man's justice might be another man's abomination," and that Germany, far from accepting
Wilson's opinion on the matter, might have been left bitter, exasperated, and vengeful by the
punishment he meted out. Id.
Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, Versailles Revisited, 9 Sec Studies 191, 199 (2000).
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including the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and,
eventually, the UN Charter. Although more of a realist about the potential of
international organizations than Wilson had been, President Franklin Roosevelt
echoed Wilsonian themes when he said that the creation of the UN "spells-and
it ought to spell-the end of the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances,
and spheres of influence, and balances of power, and all the other expedients
which have been tried for centuries and have always failed." 50
From the successes of Wilsonianism, the belief has arisen that the League
of Nations, and still more the UN, reflect a return to just war doctrine and
represent its (re)incorporation into international law. Certainly there were those
who, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, advocated that just war
doctrine should be institutionalized in such forms.1 s' And even now there are
many who appear to think that the UN Security Council has something of the
moral and legal authority with regard to war that were once ascribed to the
medieval Papacy and Empire. In a particularly clear statement of this view, the
British scholar of Christian ethics and political theology Oliver O'Donovan
writes:
Nowadays any power contemplating a resort to war has more than a
hypothetical or informal judgment to think about. Just as in the Middle
Ages there was a Pope and a Holy Roman Emperor, whose authorisation in
these matters counted for something, so today there is the United Nations
Organisation and its Security Council. To the judgment of this body there
belongs not merely moral but positive authority, grounded originally in
treaty. Its Charter claims for it the sole right to authorise or use armed force
against states other than that undertaken for self-defence against armed
attack. A belligerent power, then, ought to be prepared to defer to it, even if
it sometimes rules in a way that a truly impartial and well-informed judge
would not have ruled.152
As we aim to show below, this understanding of the UN is fundamentally
mistaken insofar as it seems to assume that traditional just war doctrine, or
something very like it, has been incorporated into the UN Charter. The Security
Council possesses nothing like the moral authority or sanction of a Pope,
Emperor, or judge; nor does the Council follow the prescriptions of just war
teaching in its practices; nor was it intended or is it legally required to do so. The
UN Charter expresses an overriding commitment, not to the aim of ensuring
that war is waged if and only if it is just, but rather to preserving the existing
international order, regardless of that order's justice or injustice. Thus, the UN
150
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Quoted in Michael Howard, The HistoricalDevelopment of the UN's Role in InternationalSecurity, in
Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, United Nations, Divided World 63, 63 (Clarendon
1993).
See, for example, C. Van Vollenhoven, The Three Stages in the Evolution of the Law ofNations (Nijhoff
1919).
O'Donovan, The ust War Revisited at 24 (cited in note 68) (citation omitted).
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Charter, rather than regulating war so as to ensure that it serves only as an
instrument of justice, has in fact become a legal mechanism for protecting state
sovereignty as against even the most compelling demands of human rights.
Instead of preventing or punishing atrocities, the Great Power politics that
dominate Security Council deliberations serve only to conceal and shelter them.
And the mistaken beliefs that the Charter is designed to regulate war-making in
the name of justice, and that the Council is generally successful in executing that
task, serve only to obscure the radical defects of a highly dysfunctional system.
IV. JUST WAR DOCTRINE AND THE UNITED NATIONS
A. The UN Charter in Theory and Practice
In order to understand the UN Charter, it is essential to recall its central
purpose. This is stated in Article 1: "To maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace." 53 In other words, the central
purpose of the Charter is to prevent war, not to promote justice or correct
injustice.154 These two goals-order and justice-are often at odds in the
international system.'s The Charter makes a definite and unambiguous choice
between them: order takes priority.'56
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154

1ss
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UN Charter, Art 1, T 1.
To say this is not to deny that the framers of the UN had other, perhaps unavowed, purposes.
Some recent scholarship has argued that the UN owed its origin largely to the thought of British
imperial internationalists like Jan Smuts and Alfred Zimmern, who saw it as an organization that
would protect the British Empire, cement the Empire's ties to the US, and create a good working
relationship between the Anglo-Americans and the world's other great power, the Soviet Union.
See generally Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the IdeologicalOrgins of the
United Nations chs 1-2 (Princeton 2009).
See Hedley Bull, The AnarchicalSociety:A Study of Orderin World Polilics 82-93 (Columbia 1977).
Legal scholars and political theorists have repeatedly called attention to the absolute priority that
the Charter gives to war prevention over all other goals. Thus, Anthony Clark Arend and Robert
Beck write:
In 1945, the world was just coming out of a devastating war begun by certain
states using force to alter violently the existing political and territorial status
quo. Based on this experience, the delegates of the San Francisco Conference
were convinced that force was simply too destructive to be considered an
acceptable means of pursuing changes or advancing other policy. Force was
not to be used to gain territory, to change the government of another state no matter how 'bad' that government may have been-or even to right a past
'wrong.' Such uses of force were considered 'aggression' or, as Professor
Myres McDougal terms them, uses of force for 'value extension,' and were
prohibited. Instead, force was to be used only for 'value conservation,' for the
preservation of the existing political and territorial status quo, either through
the exercise of self-defense or as determined by the Security Council.
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That the Charter assigns absolute priority to international peace or order
over justice, however, demonstrates how far it is from codifying traditional just
war theory. At the core of the just war tradition is the idea that one state may
legitimately use force against another state in order to serve the ends of punitive
justice. Waging a just war is akin to prosecuting a crime and (if the war is
successful) imposing a punishment or sentence on the offender that an impartial
judge would find justified and appropriate. Preserving peace and the established
order are not overriding priorities; indeed, the established order may embed and
perpetuate the very injustice that a just war is intended to remedy. Consequently,
an offensive war may be as just as a defensive one.'"' The UN Charter scheme
retains nothing of this conception of war. As David Luban says, "by giving
absolute primacy to the world community's interest in peace, [the Charter] does
not really answer the question of when a war is or can be just; rather, it simply
refuses to consider it." 58
Far from incorporating the just war theory into international law, the
Charter system obviates any need for the very type of moral and political
reasoning that is most characteristic of that theory. Jean Bethke Elshtain writes
that "the just war thinker insists on the need for moral judgments, for figuring
out who in fact in the situation at hand is behaving in a more or less just or
unjust manner. . . . For the just war thinker, moral appeals are the heart of the
matter. . . .'1' The practical reasoning involved here must reflect the tension
between a normative demand "to limit resort to arms" and a conflicting demand
"to respond to the urgent requirements of justice."' But under the Charter
scheme, there is no need for such moral deliberation and no occasion for
weighing the harms of violence against the evils of injustice. The fact that a party
has initiated a war is of itself sufficient to brand that party as the aggressor."'

Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, InternationalLaw and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN
CharterParadigm33-34 (Routledge 1993), quoting Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano,
Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of InternationalCoercion 18-19 (Yale 1961).
See also Claude, Jr., 95 Pol Sci Q at 94 (cited in note 98); David Luban, just War and Human Rights,
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Delahunty and John C. Yoo, Great Power Security, 10 Chi J Intl L 35, 42-43 & n 23 (2009).

161

36

Vol. 13 No. 1

Delabunty and Yoo

FromJust War to False Peace

To be sure, one might have hoped that in exercising its powers under
Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council would in fact have ordered or
authorized the use of military force when, and only when, such uses of force
would have been required or permitted under some likely application of just war
doctrine. But there is not even an approximate correspondence between the
Council's Chapter VII decisions and the traditional tests of jus ad bellum. The
most conspicuous case in which the Council did not apply just war doctrine is
surely that of Rwanda, where it failed to authorize a timely military intervention
that could have prevented a mass genocide.'62 The Council's refusal to authorize
the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is another obvious case in point:
although widely regarded as a legitimate and just use of force, NATO's action
was not authorized by the Council, and hence had to be considered an illegal war
of aggression under the Charter scheme. 6 1 Indeed, any outside military
intervention into the "domestic" affairs of a state, even if it fully accorded with
the tests ofjus ad bellum, would have to be considered illegal and aggressive war
under the Charter unless authorized by the Council, except in cases where such
intervention could properly be characterized as defensive, or where the state in
question had consented to the intervention by treaty or otherwise.164 As many
observers have noted, the Charter's use of force rules thus erect a formidable
legal barrier to the protection of human rights and to the safety of populations at
risk throughout the globe.
Although less well remembered than Rwanda or Kosovo, the Security
Council's treatment of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the wars in the former
Yugoslavia in the 1990s shows how wide is the gulf between just war doctrine
and the Council's practice. In this case, the Council did not merely fail to take
affirmative steps of its own to prevent atrocities (as in Rwanda) or refuse to
authorize intervention by others to prevent them (as in Kosovo); it acted
affirmatively to deny the victim of a campaign of atrocities the means to defend
itself. Under Resolution 713, the Council had imposed an embargo prohibiting
Member States from shipping arms to Yugoslavia. Even as Yugoslavia thereafter
dissolved and conflicts within its former territory intensified, the Council
reaffirmed the embargo, thus indicating that arms shipments to any of the states
emerging from that dissolution would remain illegal.
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See Samantha Power, 'A Problemfrom Hell":America and the Age of Genocide 358-82 (Basic 2002).
Under current UN use-of-force rules, NATO's action could not have been considered lawful
collective self-defense under Article 51: at the time, Kosovo was not a separate state, but a part of
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Aggression, General Assembly Res No 3314 (XXIX), UN Doc A/RES/3314, Art 5(1) (1974).
See Report of the Secretary-General Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc
8 (Jan 12, 2009) (observing that the Constitutive Act of African Union
A/63/677 at 6-7,
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The embargo had a disastrous effect on the new state of BosniaHerzegovina, which was the scene of a rebellion by the forces of the Bosnian
Serb population against the Bosnian government. The Bosnian Serbs were
materially assisted by the Serbian government, which in turn was able to draw on
the military assets of the former Yugoslav National Army. Bosnia, by contrast,
was essentially unarmed, and by reason of the embargo, was unable to arm itself
from abroad. Serb atrocities against the Bosnian Muslim population assumed the
character of genocide. Despite knowing of Bosnia's distress, the Council refused
to heed the General Assembly's call of December 18, 1992 for it to lift the arms
embargo as to Bosnia."s Further, on June 29, 1993, the Council also rejected the
same request by six of its Members, including the US."' In those circumstances,
the Bosnian government twice sought relief from the International Court of
Justice, including the request that it be allowed to secure the means to defend its
own people against acts of genocide.' In substance, Bosnia was asking the
Court to lift the Council's embargo.'
In that case, Judge ad hoc Elihu Lauterpacht reasoned that Resolution 713
had the effect of enabling genocidal acts to take place, in violation of an
"undoubted" jus cogens prohibition on genocide. Delicately, Judge Lauterpacht
wrote that although "it [was] not to be contemplated that the Security Council
would ever deliberately adopt a resolution clearly and deliberately flouting a rule
of jus cogens," nonetheless the "possibility" that a Council resolution "might
inadvertently or in an unforeseen manner lead to such a situation cannot be
excluded. And that, it appears, is what happened here.""' So viewed, he said,
Resolution 713 called on Member States, "albeit unknowingly and assuredly
unwillingly," to support "the genocidal activity of the Serbs."o Judge
Lauterpacht indicated that a Security Council resolution, valid on its face, could
be voided on judicial review if found to transgress jus cogens. We offer no opinion
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on that question here."' More relevant to our purpose, the persistence of the
Council in reaffirming Resolution 713, despite knowing that its action left the
Bosnian Muslims helpless before the Serbs' onslaught, is a vivid demonstration
that the Charter system neither codifies just war theory nor functions as a close
substitute for it. The UN Charter system deserves no cachet for being a
modernized just war doctrine.
B. False Peace
Attempting to impose just war as a restraint on jus ad bellum not only
misconceives the nature of this ancient doctrine, it also has the negative
consequence of discouraging wars that advance justice. As interpreted by many
academics and commentators, the rules of the UN Charter make the wars of the
last two decades illegal. The UN's approach to the problem of violence is much
like that of domestic criminal law: the government enjoys a monopoly on the use
of force except in cases of individual self-defense. Substitute the UN for the
government and the nation-state for the individual, and the two legal regimes
parallel each other closely. America's attack on Serbia was neither in self-defense
nor approved by the UN; most scholars come to the same conclusion
concerning the Iraq war. Therefore, they are illegal, just as a private citizen's
attack on someone else would be illegal.
Many leading American scholars of international law share this conclusion.
They see in Iraq the rise of preventative war, at odds with international legal
doctrines restricting the use of force to self-defense. Some even view the
American wars of the last decade as an attack on international law and
institutions generally. According to Professor Thomas Franck, for example, the
UN Charter system "has died again, and, this time, perhaps for good."
Controversy over the Iraq war is not a mere ad hoc disagreement about a single
war, but "a much broader plan to disable all supranational institutions and the
constraints of international law on national sovereignty."'1 2 The editors of a
special Iraq issue of the American Journalof InternationalLaw seem deeply worried.
For them, the war in Iraq "is one of the few events of the UN Charter period
holding the potential for fundamental transformation, or possibly even
destruction, of the system of law governing the use of force that evolved during
the twentieth century.""' Antiwar activists have attempted to file criminal
charges in foreign courts against President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick
171

172

173

For discussion, see Dapo Akande, The InternationalCourt of justice and the Security Council: Is There
Room for JudicialControl of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?, 46 Intl & Comp L Q
309 (1997).
Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now?: The United Nations After Iraq, 97 Am J Intl L 607, 610
(2003).
Lori Fisler Damrosch and Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: Editor's
Intrvduction, 97 Am J Intl L 553, 553 (2003).

Summer 2012

39

Chicago JournalofInternationalLaw

Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor
Condoleeza Rice, among others, for launching what they claim to be an illegal
war. 174
This criminal law approach to world politics has no longstanding historical
foundations; it leapt into international politics between the First and Second
World Wars. Some think of the UN Charter as a progressive evolution toward a
world governed by law. A broader perspective reveals the current system to be
an anomaly, both historically and intellectually. Today's rules describe not the
practice of nations, but their hopes. Nations have rarely, if ever, considered that
force can only be used in response to an armed attack. The UN Charter creates
enormous strain on the international legal system because it imposes rules that
run directly counter to the incentives of states to protect their most vital
interests-at least as international rules are currently understood by many
officials, practitioners, and scholars.
The formal international rules prohibit all wars, regardless of whether they
improve global welfare or not. Wars of aggressive conquest are a class of wars
that very likely will always reduce human welfare. Death and destruction just to
redraw a border will waste lives and resources without any compensating rise in
benefits. But borrowing as it does from the criminal law, the UN Charter treats
all conflicts other than those in self-defense as just as wasteful as wars of
conquest. This over-inclusive approach mistakenly prohibits wars that improve
global welfare. Use of force might prevent a dangerous regime from building up
the power to unleash a destructive conflict. It might prevent a human rights
catastrophe. Or it might check terrorism or international crime. Domestic
criminal law may properly seek to drive the level of violence between citizens to
zero. Police and courts exist to stop one person from harming another, not only
from overt physical force, but from fraud. The use of national force is inevitable
if greater harms are ever to be stopped, for no supranational government exists
capable of maintaining international peace and security.
The international system should adopt a regulatory approach rather than
analogize to domestic criminal law. Rules should encourage the use of
proportional force where the benefits outweigh the costs. From a
consequentialist or utilitarian perspective, the current law enforcement approach
to world conflict is dysfunctional-producing the exact opposite effect from the
one the world needs. Peace and security are what are known as public goods. A
public good is one from which others cannot be excluded and is not depleted by
their use. In economic terms, public goods are non-rivalrous and non-
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exclusive.1'7 At the domestic level, law and order, and national security, are
classic public goods. Security allows citizens to conduct business and their
private affairs without the threat of external or internal harm. An individual's
increased security does not consume security that is then not available to others
in the country.
Public goods also exist at the international level. And as with national
defense domestically, peace and security is the classic example of a global public
good. If the world is at peace, people everywhere can better raise their families,
create businesses, and produce and consume goods and services with less fear of
violence."' Nations can devote resources to raising the living standards and
improving the welfare of their citizens, rather than on soldiers and arms.
Consumption of peace by one nation does not deplete its benefits for other
nations. Another example might be free navigation of the world's oceans.
Because of the seas' vast size, ships can generally make passage without
interfering with those of other nations (aside from some heavily-used points of
congestion). All nations benefit from the ability to move people and goods on
the seas freely, a point recognized as early as Grotius's 1609 work, Mare Liberum
(The Free Sea)."'
Standard economic theory predicts that no one will produce enough of a
public good. Since the provider cannot exclude anyone from enjoying public
goods, it cannot charge enough to recover the costs. There will be free-riders:
those who benefit from the good but do not pay for it. If all citizens benefit
from national defense, no matter how much is provided, there will be some who
will choose not to pay for it unless compelled to do so. The provision of public
goods will be suboptimal unless a government can tax everyone who receives
the benefits. Hence, in the US, the federal government must secure the national
defense because it is the only entity that can tax all American citizens.
At the global level, the provision of public goods is even more unlikely
because there is no truly effective supranational government that can tax all
nations to share the burdens. No individual nation will provide the optimal
amount of international peace and security, because it cannot compel
contributions from every nation that benefits. Even in the case of the 1991
Persian Gulf War, the UN did not levy a tax on all nations to pay for the
removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Instead, the US and its allies took up the
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UN Security Council's request to come to Kuwait's aid, and then sought
voluntary contributions from wealthy nations-such as Japan-that benefited.
Seeing the use of force from this angle helps resolve some difficult
questions about war, but also poses its own challenges. If the international
system allows war when the global benefits outweigh the costs, then conflict
becomes a spectrum rather than a black or white, either-or proposition between
legitimate and illegitimate wars. The circumstances, rather than increasingly
tenuous claims of justified self-defense, will determine questions of war. Viewing
conflict as a continuum allows us to transcend the simple distinctions between
wars of preemption and prevention, a freedom agenda and stark realism, and
humanitarian intervention and stability. These differences, drawn by thinkers
over the years, are really arguments over questions of timing, expectations of
benefits and costs, and the perils of uncertainty.
Wars of self-defense, preemption, and prevention are all different versions
of the same balancing of costs and benefits and are inherently uncertain. The
probability of an attack in a case of self-defense is 100 percent-there is no
doubt about whether the enemy will attack as it is already underway. When
current international rules permit a preemptive attack, they demand that the level
of certainty approaches a similar level. In the famous nineteenth century Caroline
case, the US protested when Great Britain sent troops across its northern border
to pursue Canadian rebels hiding on US territory. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster argued that British intervention was justified only if the necessity of
force was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation.""' The Caroline case made an appearance in the Nuremburg
trials as an important definition of aggression, and has been widely hailed by
scholars in the decades since. But the Caroline rule simply elevates certainty over
other important values, such as limiting net violence, advancing democracy, or
preventing the harm and destruction of greater warfare and human rights abuses.
A more realistic, nuanced view would tie the probability and magnitude of
harm by an enemy to the amount of force and its timing. Preemption requires
anticipation of attack, as an enemy mobilizes its forces or moves them into
offensive positions. Prevention applies pressure even earlier, when a shift in the
relative balance of power makes an enemy more dangerous in the future. When
the expected harm of an attack is low because its probability is low, we are
speaking of prevention. As its likelihood increases, we begin to think of
preemption. As the possible harms of war increase, the amount of force that a
nation may use should increase at a similar rate.
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Understanding that prevention and preemption are really just facets of the
same problem sheds light on the controversy over the "Bush doctrine." Under
the Bush doctrine, the US declared that it would use force to stop terrorist
attacks before they occurred, and suggested it might even intervene to prevent
rogue nations from obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). In 2002,
the Bush National Security Strategy declared: "The greater the threat, the greater
is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place
of the enemy's attack.""' Because WMDs threaten massive civilian casualties,
nations can use force earlier to forestall the threat. Acting earlier in anticipation
of events that haven't occurred, however, makes it incumbent on nations to act
with narrower, more surgical, uses of force.
Re-orienting international rules to allow more wars that improve global
human welfare raises challenging questions of institutional design. Part of last
century's failure stems from dysfunctional international organizations. The UN
Charter created an overly strict rule (no wars other than self-defense), and
married it to a potentially broad exception (for wars to maintain international
peace and security). But the designers of the UN system placed the exception in
the hands of the Security Council, the only body that could authorize the use of
force by member nations for purposes other than self-defense. The Security
Council, however, suffers from a crippling, perhaps fatal, defect. It allows any of
its permanent members to veto any action, which means that these countries
with competing, often conflicting, interests must agree before the use of force is
authorized. This unanimity requirement has paralyzed the international political
and legal systems. During the Cold War, for example, the Security Council only
authorized the use of force twice: once for the Korean War at the dawn of the
postwar world when the Soviet Union happened to be boycotting UN meetings;
second for the Persian Gulf War at the end of the Cold War, when the decline
of superpower competition jumbled the usual alignments.
Changing the rules to expand the set of cases of justifiable war requires a
corresponding change in institutions. On one level, expanding the exception to
self-defense, but leaving the determination of these cases to the Security
Council, will change nothing. Permanent members of the Council will still use
their veto power whenever their interests are at stake, continuing the paralysis of
the Cold War period. Recent efforts to expand the legitimate use of force to
include humanitarian intervention by recognizing a "responsibility to protect,"
will continue to be doomed to failure by veto. Other ideas to expand the
Security Council's permanent members to include Germany, Japan, India, or
Brazil may bring the structure of the UN into closer alignment with the changing
balance of power in the world, but would only make the deadlock worse, since
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the more members, the likelier that one will veto (and the higher the
transactional costs of deliberation) making any decision harder to reach. A
unanimity requirement only compounds the difficulties.
At another level, changing the rules on force would require an international
institution with real authority. UN paralysis has not ended armed conflict.
Rather, it has produced an environment in which nations go to war, ignoring the
international rules. When it comes to war, states have gotten a divorce from
their international institutions. Some believe looser rules will only provide more
excuses for concealing wars of aggression. A new type of international
institution should exist to police the use of force by states so that new rules do
not return the world to the centuries of unlimited war. We believe it should be
less, not more, formal. What matters is what international force, from diplomatic
pressure on up, can and should be used against dangerous aggression. A looser
coalition may be more successful at coordinating welfare-enhancing
interventions than a highly formalized body like the UN with its cumbersome
bureaucracy and high costs of maintaining a permanent body. The world would
be better off with something less like the European Union and something more
like the Concert of Europe.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the UN Charter system nor the classic just war theory provides an
adequatejusad belum for the twenty first century.so The UN Charter system has
been remarkably ineffective in promoting international justice: it forbids
humanitarian military intervention except in the unusual cases where the
interests and views of the Permanent Members of the Security Council coincide.
Moreover, it is wholly unrealistic to hope that the Charter system can furnish the
basis for a durable peace: the "Long Peace" in Europe after the Second World
War was maintained by the condominium between the US and the USSR, not by
the UN; and if the peace in Asia is to be kept in the twenty-first century, that will
be due to an understanding between the US, China and the other Pacific and
South Asian powers, not to the UN.'8 ' The classic just war doctrine is also
unsuited to our present needs. While it permits humanitarian interventions, it
forbids preventive war: war is only "just" when, like the criminal law, it serves
punitive justice. The injuries that war can properly redress, on the classic just war
theory, are past ones; the threat of future injury, no matter how grave, cannot
justify war except when the injury is actually impending. In an age when rogue
states can credibly threaten millions of innocent civilians with instantaneous
destruction, that consequence is simply not acceptable. Both international justice
and the promotion of peace would be far better served by a more flexible
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approach that created the conditions that would be most likely to produce these
public international goods-in other words, an approach in the nature of the
balance of power or European "Congress" systems.
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